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ABSTRACT
In this study one of the most important aspects of German 
foreign policy, "Ostpolitik", is examined. The aim is to explain 
and discuss the changes in the nature of the Ostpolitik before 
and after the unification in terms of its general political and 
economic objectives, motives, and consequences.
A review of the Westpolitik oriented Christian Democrat era 
(1950-1969) and a brief history of OsLhandel are given in 
order to investigate the origins of the radical Ostpolitik of the 
early 1970s.
Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik became the hottest political topic 
in the 1970s and achieved, since the end of the Second World War, 
a "modus vivendi" with the Eastern European countries, which was 
a big step toward unification. A new era began for the Germans. 
Unification on October 3, 1990 was achieved with Kohl’s 
Ostpolitik, that is with timely and well applied policies 
paralleling the changing Cold War structure.
In ox'der to illustrate the changes in the nature of 
Ostpolitik, Germany’s new relationships with the former Soviet 
Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia (until div'ision) are analysed.
Finally, in the concluding chapter Bonn’s new understanding 
of Ostpolitik is evaluated and discussed.
ÖZET
Bu çalışma Alman Dış Politikasının önemli bir kısmını 
oluşturan "Doğu Politikasını" incelemiştir. Amaç Alman Doğu 
Politikasının, birleşme öncesi ve sonrası, içeriğini, genel 
politik ve ekonomik hedefleri, motifleri, ve sonuçları açısından 
açıklamak ve tartışmaktır.
1970’lerin başlarındaki radikal Alman Doğu Politikasının 
sebeplerini bulmak için Batı Politikası izleyen Hıristiyan 
Demokrat Parti dönemi ile Alman Doğu Ticaret Politikasından 
kısaca bahsedilmiştir.
Willy Brandt’in Doğu Politikası 1970 lerin en popüler 
politik konusu haline gelmiş ve Doğu Avrupa ülkeleri ile, ikinci 
dünya savaşından bu yana, ilk defa geçici de olsa yakınlaşma 
çabalarını gösteren antlaşmalar imzalanmıştır. Bu antlaşmalar 
birleşmeye doğru atılan büyük adımlar olmuştur.
Herşeye rağmen birleşme 3 Ekim 1990 da Helmut Kohl’un 
zamanlaması ve uygulaması, iyi seçilmiş politikaları ve Soğuk 
Savaş dönemi yapısının da değişimine paralel olarak
gerçekleştirilen Doğu Politikası ile mümkün olmuştur.
Araştırmayı tamamlamak ve Doğu Politikasındaki değişimi 
ortaya koymak amacı ile Almanyanın eski Sovyetler Birliği, 
Polanya ve Çekoslavakya ile yeni oluşan ilişkileri analiz 
edilmiştir.
Son olarak Bonn’un yeni Doğu Politika anlayışı
değerlendirilmiş ve tartışılmıştır.
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Whether or not there has been progress in the forms of 
international-order maintenance since 1815, there has 
undeniably been much change. According to Ian Clark, the period 
between 1815 to 1990 can be classified into four sub-periods: 
(a) 1815-1854, from balance to concert; (b) 1856-1914, balance 
without concert; (c) 1918-1939, concert without balance; (d) 
1945-1990, from concert to balance (1). The coming period, 
hopefully, will be an era of "concert with balance" with a 
high level of cooperation between nation-states.
Actually, the post-World War II international system (1945- 
1990) era from concert to balance has also been called the era 
of bipolarity. Because, unlike the previous eras that featured 
multiple power centers and flexible alignments, this era was 
mostly characterized by two relatively rigid blocs of states 
organized around competing ideologies and led by two dominant 
"superpowers". The Western bloc, led by the United States, 
consisted of the economically developed capitalist democracies. 
The Eastern Bloc, led by the Soviet Union, consisted of the 
developed communist states (2). This segmentation brought the 
division of Europe into Western and Eastern parts and also the 
division of Germany into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, 
member of EC -EU- and NATO) and German Democratic Republic (GDR, 
member of ex-Comecon and ex-Warsaw Pact).
INTRODUCTION
Many changes have occurred in the last fifty years, but
despite these changes, and the growth of powerful 
international forces (military, economic, and cultural), 
individual states continue to play a dominant role.
With these big systemic changes in the international arena, 
starting in 1990, there are also major changes that have 
occurred in Europe over the last few years. In this context, the 
unification of Germany deserves special consideration. Two 
powerful countries in the heart of Europe have suddenly and quite 
unexpectedly became one. Currently, no other country in Europe is 
likely to play such a critical role as Germany in shaping the 
future course of the new Europe. For the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe, as well as the former Soviet Union, a united 
Germany is seen now as a vital source of financial aid and 
investment, as well as a key trading partner needed to overcome 
the difficult challenges of economic reconstruction.
Based on this reasoning, this study seeks to deal with one 
of the most important aspects of German foreign policy during and 
after the Cold War era: The German Ostpolltik (Eastern Policy). 
Qstpolitik was Germany’s hottest political topic in the early 
1970s, and it is being Implemented today as the new
Ostpolitik.
The aim of this study is to explain and discuss the changes 
in the nature of the Ostpolitik before and after unification, its 
general political and economic objectives, motives and
consequences. The study provides a description of the origin of the 
Eastern Policy, how it was implemented, its meaning in the 1970s
and 1980s and lastly its new meaning in the 1990s.
There will be a special focus on implicit factors such as 
the role of German business which was succesful in penetrating 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
Why did Germany during the first period of its establishment 
have to choose Westpolitik? What were the reasons for a radical
Ostpolitik in the early 1970s? Why was German business so 
interested in the East European inarlcet, and how did it 
penetrate the ai'ea so easily? What was the essence of Kohl’s 
Ostpolltik in the 1980s? After the unification, what does Bonn’s 
policy with respect to the East European crisis tell us about the 
direction of German Ostpolitik in the future? In an attempt to 
answer these questions, specific eras will be analysed in 
different chapters:
In the first chapter four main subjects will be discussed:
1) Christian Democrat Konrad Adenauer and his successor 
Ludwig Erhard’s era (1949-1969) known for their famous
Westpolitik. The analysis shows that, the only opportunity left 
to Germany during that period was to turn to the West.
2) The Ostpolitik applied by the government of Willy Brandt
between 1969 and 1973 was based on three broad aims which were
also carried out extensively by his successors until
unification: establishing a modus vivendi with Moscow; expanding 
contacts of all kinds with eastern neighbours; and the ultimate 
aim of preventing the division of Germany.
3) The Helmut Schmidt era (1974-1982) was broadly dominated
by economic problems. Schmidt used the positive image 
created by Willy Brandt, thereby extending the relationship with 
Eastern Europe including the USSR. Bonn, in this era, began to 
view economics as the continuation of politics by other means.
4) With the warmer political climate created by détente and 
by Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik. West Germany’s economic relations 
with Eastern Europe, between 1970 and 1982, reached its highest 
point in 1975.
There are mainly two issues which will be explained in 
Chapter Two:
1) With the changing of the international atmosphere, during 
the late 1980s, Kohl grasped the opportunity to unify. With a 
huge aid program for the East European countries and the Soviet 
Union, he intensified Bonn’s Ostpolitik which was implemented 
from the late 1970s on. Thus, Kohl’s Deutschlandpolitik which 
was subordinated to Ostpolitik could make the final step on 
unification. In German usage, Deutschlandpolitik refers to FRG- 
GDR relations, while Ostpolitik designates the policy toward 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
2) Although unification by the German officials was not 
conceived to be likely in the near future, they were forced to 
establish the unification earlier than they expected. Unification 
was achieved on October 3, 1990.
Chapter Three provides a description of the new Germany’s 
Ostpolitik: Three exemplary cases are analyzed to illustrate the 
transformation of previously hostile German foreign policy into
one of "good neighborliness." Germany’s relationship with those 
countries, which is of vital importance also for the whole 
region, may reveal the new basis of Germany’s Qstpolitik.
When Willy Brandt became Chancellor of West Germany in 1969, 
he launched a full-blown program of normalizing relations with 
Eastern Europe, leading in 1972 to Bonn’s diplomatic recognition 
of East Germany. His "Eastern Policy" soon took on connotations 
that made the word "Ostoolitik" Germany’s hottest political topic 
during the early 1970s (1).
Brandt’s Ostpolit ik aimed at building bridges to East Europe 
and drawing the German Democratic Republic out of its isolation 
and into a dialogue with the Federal Republic. It worked: in 1972 
the two Germanys recognized each other, and in 1973 both joined 
the United Nations. Brandt’s moves calmed and normalized the 
situation in Central Europe -long the focal point of the Cold War 
and, he was awarded the 1971 Nobel Peace Price for his efforts.
PART I. GERMANY’S EASTERN POLICIES (1950 - 1982)
1. FOREIGN OCCUPATION AND NATIONAL DIVISION: 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
At the beginning of this century, the Germans were, by all 
normal standards, one of the most civilized nations in the world. 
Under Hitler’s Third Reich (1939-1945), however, they came to 
use their skill and strength negatively to support and spread 
tyriinny throughout Europe (2).
The Third Reich finally collapsed in May 1945 as American, 
Russian, British, French and other Allied forces totally defeated 
the German armies and occupied the Reich. The defeat and 
destruction of the Nazi system brought military occupation and 
massive uncertainty about the future of Germany as a national 
community (3). In 1945, Point Zero, the absolute bottom, or 
as the Germans described it "Stunde Null" (zero hour: a new
start), had been reached (4).
In 1945, when the four victorious powers -the United States, 
the USSR, Britain, and France - assumed supreme authority over 
the affairs of Germany, it had virtually ceased to exist as a 
political entity. An indefinite period of punishment and 
subjection began for the Germans. As always in history, however, 
the alliance between the East and the West disintegrated. A new 
dominant conflict began, namely the Cold War, with the division 
of Europe and evolved into a big struggle over Germany (5).
Germany then became the object of the struggle between the
contending power's because of its central location and its massive 
economic and strategic potential (6). Although a Versailles-style 
settlement did not materialize, as in 1918, Germany found itself 
in 1949 doubly reincarnated on either side of the Elbe River, 
along an East- West dividing line.
Thus, the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany 
(as well as the German Democratic Republic) was not an act of 
choice, but the result of the Allied sanction. The FRG was a 
child of bipolarity, conceived and nurtured by the strategic 
imperatives of the West (7).
Because of its different type of establishment, the Federal 
Republic of Germany was subjected to a unique degree of 
dependence and external constraints. Founded in 1949, it 
continued to lack sovereignty until 1955 due to the fact that 
the USA, Britain, and France continued their supreme authority 
under the occupation statute. After sovereignty was granted, 
however, the western powers reserved important prerogatives over 
the republic.
As Josef Joffe argues, dependence imposed itself on 
Germany in many ways (8). First there was a unique "birth 
defect". Deprived of full sovereignty, its armed forces, and its 
moral credibility, the West German diplomacy was initially 
reduced to empty-handed bargaining. The main objective was not 
the pursuit of the traditional goals of statecraft, but the right 
to be a legitimate player
Second, instead of domestic structures shaping the FRG’s 
foreign policy, the foreign policy of others in large part came 
to determine its societal orientations and political 
institutions. At the level of societj'^  , the widespread reaction 
against national socialism and Soviet-style Communism provided 
fertile soil for the seeds planted by the American occupation: 
de-nazification, democracy, liberalism, and free-market 
economics (9). While the Constitution, the Basic Law, was not 
imposed on the Germans (as it was on the Japanese), it did follow 
the guidelines laid down by the occupying military government. 
Third, instead of its own foreign policy affecting the Federal 
Republic’s international climate, the bipolar structure of the 
postwar world defined West German policy and interest.
For an occupied and then semi-sovereign country, the 
overriding goal was the slow, patient escape from subjection. A 
shattered economy, cut off from its traditional markets in the 
East, had to be rebuilt under the framework of the Atlantic 
free trade and economic integration. Although reunification was 
deliberately postponed to another and better day, it remained the 
official * raison d * etre’ of the FRG.
On October 3, 1990, little more than 45 years after the 
total collapse of the Third German Reich of Adolf Hitler, a new 
unified and democratic Germany arose, like a phoenix, from the 
ashes of history. Therefore, the three faces of dependence, as 
explained above, also disappeared.
Hence, observers of the European scene agree that the
emergence of a unified Germany, on October 3, 1990, was the most
significant event of the past few years. It can also be seen that 
this event promises to have the greatest impact on the future 
course of the new Europe.
The "new" Germany, by virtue of its size and geographical 
position, its growing influence in international organizations, 
its economic strength, and its commercial interest in Western and 
Eastern Europe, can be expected to play a pivotal role,
Gloanne argues (10). As Elizabeth Pond, also, said:
"Economically, politically and intellectually, Germany is 
uniquely a country whose time has come in a continent whose time 
has come again."(11)
After the ERG was established in 1949, all Chancellors from 
1949 to 1969 were Christian Democrats (CDU), leaders who 
favored an Atlantic and West European orientation. After
1969 until 1982, with the coming of the Social Democrats 
different policies were implemented.
1.1. Adenauer Era (1950s to the early 1960's):
WESTPOLITIK
According to Konrad Adenauer, the first Chancellor of ERG 
(1949-1963), sovereignty was the most important issue and 
could only be attained from the West in order to fasten 
security against the East (12). In fact, from Bismarck to 
Stressemann to Hitler, Germans conducted what was called 
Shaukelpolitik (a policy of balance and maneuver), which is
jockeying for advantage between the East and West (13). Adenauer 
recognized that the Federal Republic, if it wished to win the 
trust of the United States , Britain and especially France, had 
to avoid the slightest hint of a new Rapollo with the Soviet 
Union {14).
The only opportunity left to Germany was to conduct a 
Western policy, to be the "most European" nation and to translate 
Germany’s geostrategic position into a political negotiating 
power (15). As Adenauer put it at the time: "one false step, and 
we would lose the trust of the Western powers. One false step 
and we would be the victim of a bargain between the East and 
West" (16).
On the other hand, there were some who opposed 
Adenauer’s purely Western-oriented policies and put into 
place their own models. For instance, there was the Social 
Democrat Party^  leader Kurt Schumacher, a courageous survivor of 
twelve years in a Nazi concentration camp. Schumacher’s model was 
that of an independent unified Germany. Schumacher was also pro­
western, but unlike Adenauer, he refused to see himself as a 
spokesman solely for the western zones of occupation. According 
to him, the fate of the Germans’ SPD could bring the Eastern 
Zone into its own orbit (17). Alongside the Western Oriented 
policies, the Adenauer regime also developed the 
llallstein Doctrine, in which Bonn refused to have diplomatic 
relations with any country that recognized East Germany (18).
The aim of Bonn was total diplomatic isolation of the GDR.
10
Only West Germany, argued Bonn, was the real Germany, and it 
alone could speak for all Germans. Bonn insisted that diplomatic 
X'ecognition of the GDR by any third state (other than the USSR) 
would constitute an unfriendly act that would further deepen 
the division of Germany by making the existence of two German 
states appear normal.
In reply. East Germans also formulated a Hallstein 
Doctrine of their own (later known as the Ulbricht Doctrine), 
insisting that no socialist country open diplomatic relations 
with the FRG until Bonn was ready to recognize East Germany; 
accept the existing borders in Europe; renounce any nuclear 
role; and recognize West Berlin as a separate political unit.
West Germany did break off relations with Yugoslavia (1957) 
and Cuba (1963) after those states recognized the GDR. 
Increasingly, however, German leaders came to recognize that 
a hard-line approach was getting them nowhere. With the 
developments in the international arena, the Hallstein Doctrine 
became more and more expensive to uphold, and from the late 
1960s onwards, it began to be breached (19).
The roots of Ostpolitik. in fact, dated back to the last 
years of Adenauer's administration and continued to develop 
throughout Erhard's, reaching a high point with Willy Brandt. 
Bonn did initiate steps to respond to political developments in 
Eastern Europe by moving toward a gradual normalization of 
relations called the policy of movement (20).
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The significance of this policy was to demonstrate the 
Federal Republic’s willingness for a relaxation of East-West 
tensions by pursuing economic and cultural contacts with the 
East. Bonn expressed its good intentions toward East European 
capitals and set up trade missions in Eastern Europe. Commercial 
relations were opened with Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria 
between 1962 and 1964. But FRG did not revise its opposition to 
codifying the European status quo or modify its implacable 
rejection of the East-German regime (21).
Because of Bonn’s rigidity, the Federal Republic’s eastern 
policy in the early 1960s took on an increasingly anachronistic 
quality, standing in the way of fundamental changes in global 
and regional politics and suffering from erosion in the 
West as well as the East. With resistance to accepting the status 
quo and resistance to arms control on both accounts, the Federal 
Republic not only complicated its relations with the East, 
but began to lose support in the West (22).
Following Adenauer’s resignation (1963), a halfhearted 
policy of rapprochement with the East was launched by the 
Christian Democratic Chancellor Ludwig Erhard (1963-1966). 
Possibilities, however, for a more positive and radical 
Ostpolitik were seriously limited by differences within the 
coalition government and within the majority governing party 
CDU-CSU.
The real conceptual departure of Deutschlandpolitik 
and Ostpolitik began during the Grand Coalition formed in
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1966, when tlie government ( under the leadership of Kurt-Georg 
Kiesinger of the CDU and Willy Brandt of the SPD) for the first 
time officially communicated with the East German Government.
But equally important here is also the redefinition of the 
basic alliance philosophy in NATO. The Harmel Report expressed a 
new Alliance consensus on pursuing an adequate defense policy as 
well as dátente and arms control with the opponent. The Harmel 
Report created a framework which provided Alliance legitimacy for 
German Ostoolitik (23).
The result was the policy of the Brandt-Scheel government 
that led to four bilateral treaties; one with the Soviet Union 
in 1970, one each with Poland and the GDR in 1972, and a fourth 
with Czechoslovakia in 1973 (in addition to the 1971 
Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin).
1.2. The Grand Coalition (1966-1969);
Toward the end of the 1960s, bipolarity became muted along 
with the cold war and with the CDU-SPD Grand Coalition of 
1966, things began to change (24). Willy Brandt, from the SPD as 
the Foreign Minister, advocated building bridges to East Europe. 
The policy of the Grand Coalition, however, was flexible on 
tactics, but unyielding on the basics. There was no ratification 
of post-war boundaries, nor any recognition of the GDR.
The most visible result of the Grand Coalition’s initiative 
in Eastern Europe was the opening of diplomatic relations with 
Rumania in January 1967. This was initiated during the Erhard
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administration. The establishment of a trade mission in Prague in 
August 1967, and the resumption of diplomatic relations with 
Yugoslavia in early 1968 were also major initiatives (25).
There was considerable moral and political merit in 
Bonn’s willingness to pursue z'econcil iation with Eastern 
Europe in the hope that increased contacts would lead to an 
eventual solution of the German question. The Grand Coalition’s 
Ostpolitik however, produced a result opposite to the one 
intended. That is. East Germany was not being isolated but 
Integrated. The Warsaw Pact’s position on the German question was 
not loosening but tightening, and the difficulties of addressing 
the German question had increased and not decreased (27).
1.3. The Brandt Era (1969-1974):
OSTPOLITIK
Soon after, the SPD-FDP coalition government of Willy Brandt 
and Walter Scheel took office in October 1969, it became clear 
that the new government intended to pursue a highly dynamic 
policy toward the East. Although the election of 1969 had 
not been fought over foreign policy issues because 
economic and educational reform were the most prominent, a new 
Ostpolitik was the primary political purpose that brought 
the Social Democrats ( SPD ) cxnd the Free Democrats ( FDP )
together into a coalition (27).
In fact, there were significant domestic pressures for the 
change of Western oriented policies. Specifically, business and
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industrial groups, largely represented in the Free Democrats, 
were interested in the Eastern European and Russian markets 
where Germany historically had played a major role. Although the 
Social Democrats and especially Willy Brandt saw Ostpolitik 
mainly in ideological/humanitarian terms, the Free Democrats, 
even during the 1950s, had urged an open mind on the question, 
largely because of their export-oriented business clientele (28).
Brandt, cVS the Chancellor, launched a full-blown 
program of normalizing relations with Eastern Europe, leading in 
1972 to Bonn’s diplomatic recognition of East Germany. It may 
easily be argued that the Hallstein Doctrine had accomplished 
little toward the idea of unification. Brandt’s Ostpolitik 
implied there would be no reunification. Many West Germans were 
furious. Brandt rose to the challenge and told them that 
reunification of Geiunany was nothing they could hope for in the 
near future (29).
Despite national sentiments, Brandt’s Ostpolitik pushed 
German foreign policy in a direction where it obtained its 
greatest diplomatic density: in the Soviet Union; in Eastern 
Europe; and in East Germany. In many important respects, 
therefore, Brandt’s Ostpolitik matched a central diplomatic 
concern of the Soviet Union that had preoccupied Moscow since the 
mid-1950s: obtaining international recognition of the Soviet 
sphere of influence in Eastern and Central Europe.
As a consequence, the treaty package that ultimately 
resulted from Brandt’s Ostpolitik was an essential step toward
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the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 
culminating in the Helsinki Accords of 1975, which was the 
capstone of detente (30).
Because of the détente, Bonn’s Ostpolitik was actually an 
impoi'tant element in the interest calculations of both the 
Atlantic alliance and the Warsaw Pact, not because Bonn acted as 
a "balancer" between East and West (this was neither intended nor 
possible), but because Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik was the sine qua 
non for an accommodation in Central Europe.
The ideas behind Bonn’s new Ostpolitik in the 1970s 
were not new. By the late 1960s, it had become apparent that 
the German question had become Europeanized, and that it needed 
to be transformed from an issue that implied the enlargement of 
territory into an issue of enlarging human contacts between the 
German people and of improving relations between the two German 
governments.
In fact, Bonn’s new Ostpolitik envisaged a "European peace 
order," a European context in which the Germans would achieve 
not reunification, but a solution to the German question through 
a gradual process of Wandel durch Annaeherung (change through 
rapprochement), which would in turn lead to a Geregeltes 
Nebeneinander (regulated coexistence) in Europe (31).
Brandt’s rationale was such that, for moral as well as 
political reasons. West Germany should face up to the 
consequences of the Second World War and the Cold War, and
16
adjust its style and the content of its foreign policy to 
the realities of the 1970s international context (32).
At that time, according to leuan John, there were three 
different interpretations of Germany’s new Ostpolitik (33). The 
first group looked upon Brandt’s Ostpolitik as a belated 
recognition and acceptance of Germany’s defeat and its
consequences; the second regarded it as clearing the obstacles 
to a more positive relationship with Eastern Europe by accepting 
the political and territorial status quo in Central Europe; and 
the third were those who hoped that Ostpolitik would create 
conditions for the eventual achievement of a reunified Germany. 
Obviously, these nuances in the interpretations of Ostpolitik 
were not necessarily inconsistent with one another.
John argues that the Brandt administration had the feeling 
that, in contrast with the Grand Coalition’s Ostpolitik. an 
agreement with the Soviet Union should first be reached; only 
then, Brandt administration believed, would the way be clear to 
negotiate with other East European governments, including the 
GDR. In this respect Brandt’s diplomatic concept and strategy was 
similar to Adenauer’s. Brandt was determined to convey to the 
East the same measure of political accommodation and moral 
sensitivity that Adenauer had extended to the West (34).
Ostvertraege (The Eastern Treaty Package)
The specific manifestations of Bonn’s Ostpolitik, during the 
Brandt era, were the treaties signed by the Federal Republic and
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Lhe Soviet. Union in August. 1970, and by the Federal Republic and 
Poland in December 1970. These were followed by the Quadripartite 
Agreement on Berlin in 1971, the Basic Treaty between the two 
German states in 1972, and the West German-Czechoslovakian Treaty 
in 1973 (35 ). The Christian Democz'at Union, as the opposition 
party in the Bundestag, remained critical that too much had been 
conceded and too little gained, but it did not block these 
treaties in the Bundesrat (36).
In fact, the Treaty between Bonn and Moscow set the stage 
for the treaty between the Federal Republic and Poland. It was 
essentially a frontier settlement treaty, dii'ected toward 
normalizing relations between the two countries, and addressed 
more specifically the historical and moral dimensions of 
German-Polish relations. Willy Brandt said upon signing the 
Treaty in December 1970, "My Government accepts the result of 
history" {37 ) .
The Quadripartite Agreement, signed in Berlin in 1971, in 
contrast, legitimized the role of both the Federal Republic 
and the GDR in the everyday management of Berlin. Although the 
Four Powers maintained control over issues of security and 
status, the two German states gained competence over subsidiary 
problems that might arise in the context of the agreement. In 
this way, Berlin was actually turned over to a six-power regime, 
leading to its partial "Germanization" (38).
It was not until after the Quadripartite Agreement was 
completed that inter-German relations achieved greater results.
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Negotiations on the so-called Basic Treaty between the two German 
states had officially been under way from June to November 1973, 
with neither side changing its bargaining position significantly 
(39). The East German government was holding out for recognition 
as a sovereign state under international law, whereas the Federal 
Republic maintained that there existed two German states in one 
nation, requiring that relations between the two German states 
remain special.
In short, Brandt’s Ostpolitik made explicit what had long 
been implicit, i.e. -that there was not much the Germans by 
themselves could do in the prevailing bipolar configuration of 
power in Europe to change the fact of Germany’s division. 
Actually, there was a fundamental agreement between the concept 
and approach of Brandt and Adenauer, but their partly divergent 
responses to the German problem were determined by the different 
international political contexts in which they operated (40).
The Eastern Treaty Package normalized relations between West 
Germany and Eastern European countries. In conclusion, 
Ostpolitik considerably heightened the political and moral 
standing of the FRG, strengthening its international status, its 
role and its influence.
1.4 The Schmidt Era(1974-1982)
It can be argued that the intensive phase of Germany’s 
Ostpolitik had ended by the time Helmut Schmidt took over 
from Chancellor Brandt in 1974. The Schmidt administration
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mainly focused on urgent domestic economic and fiscal problems 
which were big problems for Western economies at the time.
The energy crisis and a variety of other issues directed 
Bonn’s focus more toward the West rather than the East. Although 
dictated by internal and domestic developments, this shift in 
West Germany’s concern was also enhanced by differences in the 
personality and the political outlook between the new 
Chancellor and the old (41).
During Schmidt’s period, it was in the economic sphere 
where advancement and co-operation progressed. External 
circumstances, global interdependence, and the fact that the FRG 
is an export oriented country forced Schmidt to concentrate on 
economics.
Inter-German trade increased substantially, expanding at an 
annual rate of 14% between the years 1969 and 1976. Increased 
market and investment outlets were created for West German 
manufactured goods, particularly during the mid-1970s. Comecon’s 
share in West Germany’s exports rose from 5.5% in 1970 to 9% in 
1975 (42). Aided by its geographical position. West Germany 
became the single largest external trading partner of Eastern 
Europe.
There were no official meetings between the FRG and the 
USSR in 1975, 1976, and 1977, and it could be easily argued that 
during this period the political dialogue between them stagnated 
somewhat. Despite the fact that Schmidt added very few elements
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to the Brandt version of Ostnolitik. it was known that he 
established a measure of mutual trust between the FRG and USSR 
during his era.
In general, John argues, from 1974 onward the salience of 
Ostpolitik in the foreign policy of the FRG and of the German 
problem in East-West relations declined for a number of reasons 
(43). First, there was general disillusionment among those 
Germans who had entertained exaggerated expectations. Second, the 
bilateral pluise of Ostpolitik gave way to a multilateral 
stage, such as that East-West issues were handled through 
procedures of the CSCE. Third, while East-West detente continued, 
the political aspect of the German problem ceased to preoccupy 
the attention of the superpowers at least until the early 1980s. 
Fourth, the policy agenda of the Bonn government changed: 
economic and trade issues loomed much larger as a consequence of 
the successive oil crises, deflation and the debt problem. 
Fifth, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt’s emphasis was on economic 
issues and on Germany’s ability to translate its economic
power into political influence and leverage. Sixth, the GDR’s 
attention increasingly shifted to the improvement of the material 
standard of living of its people, which was seen to be much more 
important as a source of legitimacy than ideological commitment. 
However, the crisis of détente in the late 1970s and the revival 
of East-West tension in the early 1980s focused attention on 
Germany and brought the "German Question,"{ the division-halt of 
Germany) to the fore.
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With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in December 
1979, American foreign policy reflected tension. A new "Cold 
War" atmosphere was created. The Reagan administration called 
for an economic sanction against the Soviet Union. Chancelloi' 
Schmidt, however, while supporting the United States in its 
sanctions and boycotts, continued to meet with the Soviet leader, 
Leonid Brezhnev in July 1980 and signed a 25-year agreement on 
economic cooperation (44).
Also the mounting Comecon debts and narrowing export 
markets caused a sharp contradiction in East-West trade. The 
Comecon bloc’s share of West Germany’s exports declined to only 
6% in 1981. These factors combined meant that the maintenance of 
the Ostpolitik detente became increasingly difficult during the 
years between 1980-1985 (45).
During this period, although Ostpolitik was stagnating and 
both the FRG and the GDR were anxious. East Germans for economic 
reasons and the West Germans for political reasons tried to 
maintain the dialogue. They tried to establish their own mini­
détente ( 46 ) .
Whereas Willy Brandt was more of a visionary, Helmut 
Schmidt was a much more pragmatic politician. He was fully 
supportive of expanded Osthandel (trade with the East bloc) as a 
way of increasing East-West interdependence, which in turn, 
according to him, would promote detente.
During Schmidt’s Chancellorship, the Federal Republic
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gained a degree of power in international politics that it had 
not experienced previously (47). His policies were so timely that 
he utilized the success of Brandt’s Ostpolitik to extend 
Germany’s influence world-wide (48).
2. GERMAN OSTHANDEL (TRADE WITH EASTERN EUROPE) 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS
The long-standing German tendency for Osthandel is driven 
mainly by geography. Ethnic Germans, including many merchants, 
settled throughout Eastern Europe beginning in the thirteenth 
century. In fact, most of Poland’s large cities were founded by 
Germans as focal points for trade. In the seventeenth century 
in Moscow, tlie ax'ea reserved for foreign merchants was known 
simply as "the German quarter", and Germany itself extended until 
1945 as far east as what is now Kaliningrad in Russia.
Within these historical realities it is easy to understand the 
German desire to do business in the East during the Cold War 
era (49). This inclination, during this era, to do business 
with member states of a hostile military alliance often
aggravated the United States.
2.1. The German Economic Programme in Eastern Europe
Before World War II:
The breakdown of the liberal economic world order during the 
crisis of the early 1930s encouraged the growth of a number of 
regional economic arrangements in many parts of the world. In 
continental Europe the most important development of regionalism 
was undertaken by Germany with most of the states of eastern and
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south-eastern Europe through state intervention, foreign-exchange 
controls, and bilateral trade agreements (50).
At that time and even before, many German political 
economists argued that the free trade world market economic 
doctrines had their disadvantages. Under this system, in the 
event of a crisis, the producers, consumers, and the state could 
not control themselves. In oi'der to achieve economic security, 
and particularly military security, German political economists 
argued that deiiberate planning of their economic development was 
necessary (51).
Within this framework, also because of lack of colonial 
areas rich in raw materials, it was easy for some German leaders 
to develop the idea of the need for a Lebensraum (Living 
Space) within which their economic development could take place. 
Beginning in 1934, Germany started attempts to lay down the 
foundations of a Grossraumwirtschaft. Embracing the states of 
South-Eastern Europe, which would be essentially an area adjacent 
to Germany with surplus agricultural and raw materials and could 
be developed in a planned adjunct to the Central German
industrial system (52).
After conquest and occupation by Germany, of a major part 
of continental Western Europe, Poland, and Czechoslovakia and 
South-Eastern Europe in the Spring of 1940, it was time for an 
new economic era for Europe in which the ideas of the 
Grossrauinwirtschafb could be put into effect. It was explicitly 
stated by Germany that the new Europe with a different economic
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system would be under German leadership (53). The doctrine of 
Grossi^aumwirtSchaft created the complementarity between the East 
European states, predominantly agricultural and raw material 
producing states, and Germany as an industrial state (54).
As E. A. Radice states, according to some Hungarian archival 
documents, Germany, before WW II, established three principal 
objectives for the economies of South-East Europe: a) farming
and agriculture based industries would remain nationally owned 
but would be developed through directed cooperation to serve 
the needs of the German market; b) other industries would be
transformed into German concerns; c) any industry which was
inconvenient to German interest would be phased out (55). As a 
consequence, in early 1940s the countries of Eastern and South- 
Eastern Europe all found themselves closely bound to Germany by 
bilateral agreements.
2.2. Osthandel (Trade with Eastern Europe)
During the Cold War Era
Following the Second World War, however, economic relations
with the Eastern block were minimal, dominated by political
desires not to strengthen the political (and potential military) 
enemy. A key change came in the late 1950s, when West German 
politicians recognized that the division of Germany would 
persist. The opinion gradually took hold that the FRG had more to 
gain by fostering contacts with East Germany and Eastern Europe.
FRG’s Osthandel policies hinged on the recognition that
because East Germany had been forcibly included in the Soviet 
block, relations could never be, in principle, any better than 
those with the Soviet Union. The Germans then began to view 
economics as the continuation of politics by other means (56).
Cole Thompson argues that after many discussions 
politicians saw trade as a politically acceptable way to achieve 
two goals: a) expanding the web of contacts between the two 
Germatiys; b) demonstrating to tlie Soviet Union that good 
relations witii West Germany were in the Soviets’ material 
interest, thereby minimizing the likehood that the Soviet 
leaders would destroy these good relations by cutting off access 
to West Berlin (57).
Under this new policy. West German trade with 
Eastern block countries became an accepted, if arcane, area of 
export activity for West German firms beginning in the early 
1960s (58). In the warmer political climate created by detente 
and by Willy Brandt’s Qstpolitik. West German trade with the 
East between 1970 and 1982 expanded, and in 1975 reached its 
highest point (59). It should also be pointed out here that 
Helmut Schmidt said in 1975 "for years our economic policy has 
been at the same time our foreign policy" (60).
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PART II- THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND THE GERMAN UNIFICATION
3. THE KOHL ERA (1982-1989): 
DEUTSCHLANDPOLITIK
In the early 1970s, many Germans accused Brandt of being 
a traitor who had "sold out Germany." Large sections of the 
Christian Democrats, particularly former immigrants from the 
East and Josef Strauss’s Bavarian CSU, denounced the treaties 
Brandt had arranged with the Soviet Union, Poland, and East 
Germany (1).
By 1972, however, most Germans agreed with Brandt and began 
to believe that normalization with Eastern Europe, including East 
Germany, was a good step. It was better to have contact with 
East Germany than to argue it did not exist. During the 1972 
elections, the SPD advanced, while the CDU declined and the 
treaties were ratified by the Bundestag. Brandt’s Ostpolitik 
did something the Hallstein Doctrine never accomplished: it 
undermined the stability of the East German regime by increasing 
popular discontent (2).
The policies applied by Bi-andt and Schmidt helped 
reawaken the longing in West Germany for reunification. According 
to Roskin, within this atmosphere Ostpolitik achieved its final 
legitimation when the Christian Democrats returned to power in 
1983. Kohl proclaimed, "We Germans do not accept the division 
of our fatherland," and "The unity of our nation lives on." 
Instead of Ostpolitik. the key word became Deutschlandpolitik 
(3).
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It is interesting that the CDU-CSU coalition had opposed 
the ratification of all Eastern treaties signed by the Brandt 
administration in the early 1970s, and had also been critical of 
Helmut Schmidt’s policy of détente. Once in government, however, 
they changed their position towards the GDR and became 
enthusiastic advocates of closer relations with the government of 
GDR.
Like his predecessors, in the 1980s, Kohl also used the bait 
of West German trade and credit to encourage the East German and 
Soviet regimes to allow greater contact between the two Gerraanys. 
In fact, Deutschland -and Ostpolitik, after the mid-1980s, had 
become part of the West German political consensus (4).
Deutschlandpolitik ( Germany policy ) was to the 1980s 
what Ostpolitik (eastern policy) used to be for the 1970s in the 
politics of the FRG. The CDU offered Deutschlandpolitik as a 
reply and corrective to SPD’s Ostpolitik. The Kohl government 
wanted to prove to the electorate that the SPD did not have a 
monopoly over solutions to the "German Question".
Neither of the two policy proposals were mutually 
exclusive, because both envisioned drawing the two German states 
closer. Ostpolitik normalized relations with the East, including 
East Germany, and then stopped; while Deutschlandpolitik brought 
the issue to a head so that unification could occur on October 
3, 1990.(5)
According to Gert-Joachim Glaessner, the thirty years of
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Deutschlandpolitik pursued by the Federal Republic of Germany 
adhered to some criteria: a) The primary objective was not 
reunification but the right of self-determination for all 
Germans; b) Deutschlandpolitik was subordinate to Ostpolitik. The 
primary objective lay in establishing a modus vivendi and a 
reconciliation with the neighboring countries of Eastern Europe. 
The only lasting success in this area, Joachim Glaessner argues, 
could offer any opportunity for a general improvement of the 
situation in Germany; c) Deutschlandpoli tik was subordinate to 
the policy of the Western alliance. The resolution of the 
division of Germany was conceivable only in a European peace 
order; d) the combination of Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik 
was possible only if the political situation in the socialist 
states was accepted in its existing form; e) the 
Deutschlandpolitik of the Federal Government and the opposition 
parties failed to foresee the gravity of developments after 
Gorbachev assumed power (6).
Further, despite the hopes of a new political order in 
Europe kindled by Soviet policies after 1985, there were no signs 
of change in the objectives of Deutschlandpolitik until mid-1989. 
It was because unification was not seen in the near future. After 
a short term deterioration in relations with the Eastern 
Bloc in 1983, the Soviet Union sought to put pressure on the 
Kohl government to shelve the NATO modernization plans. From 
Spring 1984 onwards, both the Kohl government and East German 
governments could have made steps towards rapprochement. They 
tried to establish their own mini-détente (7).
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Once more during the winter of 1984 tliere were top level 
contacts between West German and East European governments. 
However, tlie eruption of the Tiedge spy scandal in 1985, and the 
new Soviet leader Gorbachev’s desire to re-establish control over 
the Soviet Union’s East European partners dampened these hopes 
during 1985-86 (8).
Detente, after the cool relations between the ERG and USSR, 
was re-established in 1987. With the conclusion of the INF treaty 
and re-establishment of harmony between the superpowers, the 
Soviet Union placed high priority upon good relations with the 
Federal Republic. The economic weakness of the USSR and the 
centrality of economics to the Gorbachev project dictated a 
close relationship with the Federal Republic.
■ T
Closer economic relations were at the center of the visit by 
Kohl to Moscow in October 1988 (9). In fact, the biggest trade 
partner in the East for West Germany in the last two decades was 
tlie Soviet Union, which accounted for about 40 percent of German 
Osthandel, followed by East Germany with about 27 percent.
Until the full impact of Soviet President Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s perestroika in the Soviet Union was felt in 1988, the 
East was a market that did not seem to be worth the trouble for 
most Western firms. West German firms, however, continued their 
industrial tradition and vigorously pursued Osthandel. despite 
unsatisfactory conditions.
In tandem with these developments, relations between
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the two Gerinan states reached a new level in 1987, when 
Erich Honecker became the first leader of East Germany to step 
onto West German soil.
In fact, the consensus on Deutschlandpolitik reflected 
the West German belief that any eventual reunification 
of the country depended primarily on the Soviet Union. That is 
why both German officials and public opinion welcomed the new 
thinking and reform policies instituted by the Soviet leader 
Mikhail Gorbachev since 1985.
Public opinion studies in the late 1980s also indicated that 
Gorbachev was more popular in West Germany than the U.S. 
President Reagan. The proportion of West Germans who desired the 
Federal Republic to give equal weight in foreign policy to the 
United States and the Soviet Union rather than to depend 
exclusively on the U.S. increased from 41% in 1983 to 68% in 
1987 (10).
In sum, from an international perspective, the 
significance of Ostpolitik was that it could not be realized if 
detente policies were not favored by the United States and the 
Soviet Union. In that sense, the detente atmosphere helped the 
Os tpolitik efforts. However, the realization of Ostpolitik 
also helped to facilitate the realization of detente.
It can be argued that, detente in Europe was not possible 
without the successful realization of Ostpolitik (11). On the 
other hand, it can also be said that, without Perestroika in the
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late 1980s, Deutschlandpolitik, the extension of Ostpolitik, 
would not have succeeded. Either way, these policies influenced 
one another (12).
3.1. The Road to Unification
West Germany’s policies, since its birth in 1949, were 
shaped to a great extent by its international context. While the 
original aim of the victors of World War II had been to contain 
Germany, their quarrel about it divided the country. From then 
on, there were four main policy aims left to the Federal 
Republic of Germany: a) preservation of its security against 
the Soviet threat; b) membership of the Western alliance; c) 
rehabilitation as a member of the international society with 
optimal freedom of action; and d) unification (13).
Unification was the main goal of West German foreign 
policy since the first days of the Federal Republic. The first 
Chancellor Adenauer tried to achieve these points. According 
to him, the success of his Westpolitik would produce the 
unification of Germany. But it did not. As the division of Europe 
deepened in the 1950s and 1960s, the two German states and their 
societies moved further and further apart.
With Adenauer’s policy, the Federal Republic was firmly 
integrated into the West, then successive governments from Brandt 
through Helmut Schmidt to Helmut Kohl pursued a policy that 
accepted the status quo in order to change it. Each settled the 
issues with the East so that they initiated cooperation through
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bilateral treaties and multilateral processes, such as in the 
CSCE (14).
Complemented by the Deutschlandpolitik and Ostpolitik of 
Brandt, Schmidt and Kohl, and always sustained by the Free 
Democrats, Adenauer’s policy in the end did help to produce 
German unification. It was, in fact, part of the general revision 
of the East European order through internal change -as well as 
external- and the negotiated Final Settlement which was a 
meeting of the FRG, GDR, USA, USSR, and French representatives in 
Ottowa ( "two plus four" formula treiities) that officially 
produced unification in October 3, 1990.
The three major political forces within Germany had in 
different ways, contributed to Germany’s unification (15). The 
Social Democrats, after strongly opposing Adenauer’s policy 
of Western integration, endorsed and developed it, with the 
implementation of Ostpolitik. after the late 1960s. The Christian 
Democrats did the same after 1982 with the Social-Liberal 
Coalition’s bilateral and multilateral Ostpolitik. The Free 
Democrats were constantly ready to support the new 
policies. It may be argued that the major elements that 
produced German unification reflected also the consensus of 
Germany’s political parties.
There are some important historical differences in the 
process of the unification of the Germanys. Unlike Bismarck’s 
unification of 1871, Kohl’s unification on October 3, 1990, was 
without "blood and iron". This time, however, unification was
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brought about not against the will of other countries but with 
their consent and active support.
3.2. The Soviet Union and the Unification
With regard to the German problem, the Soviet Union had a 
key role. That is why, the West German policies toward the Soviet 
Union have had a special dimension (16). Once Willy Brandt said 
"the German question can be solved only with the Soviet Union, 
not in opposition to it..." (17).
In fact, the FRG experienced three basic pliases of
polic^ y toward the Soviet Union: Adenauer’s pui'suit of the 
Western option; the development of the new Os t-and 
Deutschlandpolitik of the Social-Liberal coalition (with the 
first step taken during the Grand Coalition); and the period 
since the late 1970s which emerged from the rise of domestic 
pressures for revisionism with regard to nuclear deterrence and 
West Germany’s international posture. In all three phases. West 
German policy and its evolution were heavily influenced by 
policies, opinions and events in the Western alliance (18).
When Bonn dealt v^ ith the Soviet Union on the question of 
nuclear arms control, East-West economic cooperation, or matters 
of human rights, there was always an implicit, and sometimes 
explicit element for Bonn’s Deutschlandpoli tik. In order to 
improve intra-German contacts in the context of bi'oader European 
approaches, Soviet consent was always required (19).
In fact, there are also three dimensions as to how the
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Soviet Union wiis viewed in the FRG during the Cold War era: as an 
expansionist military threat, as an ideological threat, and as a 
potential partner for political and economic cooperation. 
Traditionally and from the earliest postwar years, the key image 
of the Soviet Union was that, it represented a regional 
expansionist, military and ideological threat (20).
But, since the mid-1980s, the policies of Mikhail Gorbachev 
undermined this traditional threat perception. Despite continued 
recognition of Soviet military potential, the Soviet Union was 
increasingly seen as a power in decline.
The current younger generations have never experienced the 
Soviet Union as an ideological and military threat; with 
Gorbachev they saw only the new image. This helped to strengthen 
the importance of the third dimension to FRG’s perception of 
the Soviet Union; as a potential partner in the fields of 
political and economic relations as well as in ai*ms control and 
disarmament (21).
Even under the conditions of declining Soviet power and 
growing internal change within the Soviet sphere of influence, 
relations with the Soviet Union remained the central element of 
West Germany’s Ostpolitik until unification (22). It is because 
the progress of German unification required an international 
environment that could not be created without the consent or 
active support of the Soviet Union, even if Gorbachev was at the 
very beginning cool towards unification.
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In retrospect, Alpo M. Rusi stated that there were at 
least two preconditions that emerged to facilitate unification: 
a) the policy of the Soviet Union to build a com?non European 
home (Gorbacliev could see the hardened ideological and economic 
problems at home and declared his policies "perestroika" and 
"glasnost") ; b) the deepening of the sense of German unity 
between the German states (23).
In fact, since the end of 1986, the West German 
government started speaking favorably about perestroika, and 
even made public statements with respect to the conditions 
for ending the division of Europe so as to open the way for the 
unification of the two Germanys (24).
Regarding unification, FRG President Richard Von Weizsaecker 
said in 1987 that:
The subject of unity, as it presents itself to us 
today, is primarily a pan-European matter. Unity of 
Europeans means neither administrative unity nor 
equivalence of political systems, but rather a 
shared path based on human progress in history. The 
German question is, in this sense, a European 
responsibility. But to work towards that goal in 
Europe, by peaceful means, is above all a matter 
for the Germans (25).
Federal Minister for inter-German relations, Dorothee Wilms,
also said in a.speech in 1988:
We are aware that the division of Germany will not 
overcome in the near future because Europe itself 
remains divided... The preconditions for unification 
simply do not exist- either in terms of internal 
German relations or in the relations between the 
four victorious allies of the Second World War(26).
The main issue of unification before the 3rd of October 1990
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was no longer whether it would take place, but when and how. In
fact, formal procedures of unification began with
Chancellor Kohl’s speech in the Bundestag on November 28, 1990
in which he declared the 10-point plan for unification (27). He
also made clear that his coalition government had indeed
pursued an active Ostpolitik:
The CSCE process played an important role; we 
worked together with our partners to reduce the 
causes of tensions..A new stop in East-West 
relations could evolve thanks to the continual 
summit diplomacy of the superpowers and the 
countless meetings that were possible in this 
context - meetings between state and party leaders 
from East and West ... The broad treaty politics 
of the Federal leadership toward the Soviet Union 
and all the other Warsaw pact states gave this 
development important impulses (28).
Although Kohl could not predict unification in his official 
speeches throughout the 1980s, the division of Germany was 
unnatural for him. According to Heilbrunn, Kohl created the 
conditions, and seized the opportunity for unification. One of 
Bismarck’s famous declarations was that, in the duty of states, 
man has to listen for the rustling mantle of history and seize 
its hem. In 1989 Kohl did it (29).
Karl Kaiser argued that there were four external 
questions for unification (30). First, how could the concerns 
about the power of a united Germany be assuaged? Second, how 
could unification be achieved while also assuring Germany’s 
continuing participation in Western structures of integration, 
notably NATO? Third, how could unification be accomplished 
without discrimination and legal restrictions on German
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sovereignty? Finally, how could there be an international 
settlement resolving all questions, for instance, border issue 
with Poland, left over from WW II, while avoiding a general 
peace conference with all of Germany’s wartime adversaries.
It became clear from the very beginning that these questions 
could be solved only by using some multilateral and bilateral 
processes (31). Foi' instance, to accommodate increased German 
power, a sti'engthening of European integration was needed. 
Consequently, Bonn increased its support for the Economic and 
Monetary Union in 1991, and again, during an intergovernmental 
conference in Paris for political union.
In addition to all of these, all-European security 
structures would have to be strengthened, guarantees would have 
to be given to the East and West in order to eliminate concerns 
about the military strength of Germany; transitional arrangements 
would have to be found for the stationing and withdrawal of 
Soviet troops from East Germany; qualitative improvements in 
Soviet-German relations should end the postwar enmity; and a firm 
recognition of borders would remove any perceived potential for 
territorial revisionism due to unification. All these were 
accomplished.
3.3. The 1989-1990 Era
The peaceful revolutions that occurred during the second 
half of 1989 in central and eastern Europe were the most dramatic 
events of the Cold War. The events began with the installation of
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a non-communist regime in Poland to which the Soviet Union did 
not react violently, and this excitement spread through the 
Warsaw Pact nations like wild fire. As 1990 unfolded, the old 
structure of the Cold War International system lay in ruins.
It is remarkable that noone saw this transformation coming. 
What happened was almost entirely unpredicted and unprecented. 
Gorbachev had stated early in his rule that he would not 
interfere in the internal affairs of other states - he renounced 
the Brezhnev Doctrine -but no one took him seriously (32). In 
fact Gorbachev’s agenda tolerated not only deviation within the 
Warsaw Pact but the free expression of differences within the 
socialist system as long as Soviet security interests were not 
threatened (33).
Subsequently, the East German government took the 
decision, on November 9, 1989, to open the intra-German border 
between them and breached the Berlin Wall on November 11, 
1989 (34). Chancellor Kohl proposed, on November 28, a 10-point 
plan for a confederation of the two Germanys to the Bundestag. 
In the first stage, the Federal Government would intensify 
scientific, technological and environmental cooperation with 
the GDR; in the second, after free elections (to be held in 
March), it was proposed to set up confederal organs and 
procedures for political harmonization; and in the third, to 
proceed towards the goal of a German federation in a form which 
would fit into the future architecture of Europe (35).
After the events in East Germany, the Western powers and the
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Soviet Union reacted promptly and for the first time, especially 
with Soviet pressure, representatives of the US, Soviet Union, 
UK, and France met in Berlin to discuss the developing situation 
in Germany (36). Statements by French politicians that 
unification required the prior consent of the four major powers, 
implying that the World War II victors were intent on slowing 
down and controlling the process of German unification, gave rise 
to much ii'ritation and resentment in Germany (37).
The United States found the creation of a united Germany 
less of a problem than did Germany’s neighbours. The U.S. 
administration gave full support to German unification. U.S. 
policy was based on the realistic assumption that it served 
American interests to support a unification process that would 
produce Western Europe’s most powerful country and a potential 
partner in the future (38).
For Britain and France, German unity was foremost a question 
of accommodating a new power (39). In the very beginning, both 
Britain and France played with the idea of retaining 
elements of the Four Power rights. Once the "two plus four" 
formula was established which was a meeting of the FRG, GDR, USA, 
UK, USSR, and French representatives in Ottowa for the purpose of 
Final Settlement with respect to Germany, and the talks began, 
both countries unequivocally supported the concept of a fully 
sovereign Germany and constructively contributed to that 
outcome.
Initially, the Soviet government wAs cool toward
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unification. Since the 1950s its position was that unification 
could only take place if the two German states agreed, if 
socialism in East Germany remained intact and if Germany were to 
become neutral.
The main obstacle to the resolution of the problem was 
the Soviet opposition to a united Germany’s membership in NATO. 
The debate about this issue had been to a large degree cut-off 
by Chancellor Kohl and President Mikhail Gorbachev meeting in 
the Caucasus on July 16, 1990.
The bilateral treaty between them signed after the "two 
plus four" Final Settlement, intensified cooperation with 
regular meetings on all levels and consultation in case of 
crises. Briefly, for the two Germanys, the Caucasus agreement 
brought unification; for the Soviet Union, it brought urgently 
needed economic assistance; moreover, it created the option of a 
permanent politico-economic relationship between a declining 
superpower and an economic superpower (40).
Very early in the negotiation process Gorbachev had called 
unification unrealistic, but he (like some other Western leaders) 
came to recognize that the unification process could not be 
halted from the outside. But they also thought that there had to 
be some diplomatic procedures aimed at negotiating an appropriate 
political and security framework within which a unified Germany 
could be accommodated, and in the view of some governments, 
contained (41).
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The main issues, however, were substantially defused in 
February 1990 at Ottawa, when the Foreign Ministers of the USA, 
USSR, UK, France, FRG and GDR agreed to the so-called "two plus 
four" formula for discussing the external aspects of German 
unification (42). After having decided on the form a unified 
Germany would take, the government representatives of FRG and 
GDR had to meet those of the four powers, with special rights to 
formulate the external or international arrangements for the 
restoration of complete sovereignty to a united Germany. The 
major issues to be discussed were Germany’s borders, security 
status and the abrogation of the rights and responsibilities of 
the Four Powers with respect to Berlin and Germany as a whole.
Germany’s eastern borders were especially problematic, 
being an issue unresolved since WW II. The Final Settlement of 
1990 described the existing borders of a united Germany, also 
asked Poland and Germany to confirm their borders. On November 
14, 1990, Germany and Poland signed a border treaty (43).
In the end, even the territorial issues could not slow down 
the momentum toward unification. Germany received its unity 
earlier than expected. All of its essential hopes and wishes 
were fulfilled (44).
After the Bonn government, in January 1990, was faced with 
popular pressures in East Germany (the continued erosion of the 
authority of the Modrow government and the progressive 
deterioration of the economy) the way was then open for 
progress towards a united Germany (45).
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In July, economic and monetary union came into force. Later, 
on the 31st of August the governments of the FRG and GDR 
concluded the treaty which provided for union in accordance with 
Article 23 of the Bonn Basic Law (the constitution of the Federal 
Republic). This article declared that "in other parts of Germany 
the Basic Law will enter into force upon their accession"(46)
After the " two plus four" formula treaties were signed by 
the foreign ministers of the USA, USSR, UK, France, the FRG and 
the prime minister of the GDR, on September 12, 1990, and 
procedural steps were t ¿\ken toward unification, at midnight, on 
October 2, 1990, the German Democratic Republic ceased to
exist, and a united Democratic Federal Germany was proclaimed.
On the 14th of October elections were held in the five newly 
restored East German Laender (states) resulting in victory for 
the center-right coalition, with the CDU as the largest party 
among all. Lastly, after the all-German Bundestag elections, on 
December 2, the political process of unification was completed 
with newly elected all German deputies meeting in the Bundestag 
in Bonn.
3.4. The New Germany
There could be no greater symbol of the breakdown of the 
Cold War system than a single Germany. Since its inception, the 
joint occupation and division of Germany had been the focal point 
of the Cold War.
Because Germany was defeated and divided, and because its
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international status (and that of Berlin) was regulated by the 
"Four Powers," its economic weight could not fully translate 
into political might (48). Part of the Allied policy was to 
contain Germany from all aspects (politically and 
economically). But now by 1994 a united Germany is the largest, 
most prosperous European state, and it has more potential than 
its neighbours economically as well as politically (49).
The Kohl Administration, in the early stages of 
unification, was anxious to reassure the EC colleagues that 
unification would not turn Germany’s interest away from Western 
Europe towards Eastern Europe. Officials repeatedly declared that 
Germany was anchored firmly to Western institutions and values 
and the aim of a united Germany in a moi'e deeply integrated 
Europe (50).
Obviously, in an international sense, unification was not 
possible because of the result of specific policies pursued by 
the West, but rather the result of a shift in the international 
system which changed the whole shape of East-West relations, as 
Christoph Bluth also argues. (51).
Overall, in a national sense, unification arrived largely 
because the Soviet Union had lost its will to retain control in 
Eastern Europe. It was not a direct result of any West German 
government policy. Nevertheless, Ostpolitik had clearly played a 
major role over preceding years in weakening the credibility of 
the GDR regime, winning the trust of the East German people, and 
creating the conditions in which the Soviet Union felt safe
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enough to let go of its greatest prize of the World War II. As 
Willy Brandt once pointed out in the 1970s, a policy of 
confrontation with the Soviet Union would not have created 
those conditions (52).
Thus, the reunification of Germany was an important event 
for at least two reasons: a) it changed enormously the power map 
of Europe and hence the way the international political system is 
configured. Without question, a united Germany will be the most 
powerful and influential state in Europe after the process of 
developing the economy of former East Germany is completed; 
b) the new Germany will make a vital difference in how Europe 
will be organized. Broadly the process and outcome of German 
reunification will affect the organization of the evolving 
international system (53).
There are two more points about the reunification which are 
also important because they represent examples of how the new 
international system, the new international order, operates 
differently from the Cold War system (54). Firstly, the Cold War 
superpowers were unable to greatly influence the process. 
Specifically, Kohl traveled to Moscow in July 1990 to assure 
Gorbachev that a reunified Germany, still a member of NATO, posed 
no threat to the Soviet Union. Part of his offerings was the 
promise of German economic assistance for the transformation of 
the Soviet economy.
The second point is about the way in which unification 
occurred. Unification was indeed a private act by the German
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people acting almost without governmental direction. The 
population of East Germany simply walked across the border and 
joined the West. They first united de facto. then de jure with 
the "two plus four" Final Treaty.
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PART III-THE NEW EASTERN POLICY
With the demise of Soviet power and the decline of the 
communist regimes in Eastern Europe the international system has 
also changed. Individual states began to re-examine their roles 
and foreign policies. This is especially true for Germany. 
Germany has to cope with the domestic consequences of
unification, as well as meet expectations of the newly reformed 
East European states.
Because of the mistrust of Germany, the key challenge West 
European politicians face now is, as Lothar Gutjahr pointed out, 
"will the Germans look once more to the East, now from a position 
of political and economic supremacy?" (1)
4.FROM DISTRUST TO GOOD NEIGHBOURLINESS
Even before the unification, in the late 1980s, one could 
see the traces of Kohl’s new Ostpolitik. In fact, Germany’s new 
interest towards Eastern Europe increased with Gorbachev’s 
policies of perestroika and glasnost. No one could see
unification in the near future. Ostpolitik was there mainly 
to support the Deutschlandpolitik.
Back in the early days, the FRG, at the expense of its 
unification, made its decision to go for a safe anchorage in the 
West. This Westpolitik worked.
Willy Brandt’s opening to the East in the 1970s aimed to 
keep the concept of the German nation alive by improving
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relations with communist East Germany. In order to put pressure 
on the East Germans, contacts were expanded with the Soviet Union 
and the rest of Eastern Europe. Ostpolitik worked there, too.
Towards the end of the 1980s Germany was already Europe’s 
dominant economic power. Its relationship with Eastern 
Europe, especially with the Soviet Union, was far beyond that of 
its other Western partners. Even before unification, it was 
argued that "West Germany will look even mightier if weapons and 
other East-West barriers continue to disappear." (2)
As in the past when Germany turns East, some other Western 
European states, mainly France, are not sure of what to do 
(3). So it was when Willy Brandt launched Germiiny’s Ostpolitik 
just over two decades ago. The same premise holds true now for 
the newly united Germany, its clout having further increased by 
the collapse of the Soviet Union.
West Germany, after 1989, has been linked to the East by 
geography and history. But even before the unification as the 
world’s biggest exporter and Europe’s strongest economy, it has 
long been the communist world’s chief trading partner in the 
West.
Throughout the late 1980s Germans showed that they had the 
stamina to do business in East Europe. The people with 
whom they had worked together before the decline of communism 
emerged again as the new economic elite under a free market 
system. So, in the early 1990s while the actors remained the
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same, the economic landscape in Eastern Europe 
upheaval, and Osthandel is taking new shapes (4).
is in
Table 1: EEC EXPORTS IN 1988 est , to:
1 1 
I 1 FRG ! ITALY 11 FRANCE 1 BRITAIN \OTHERS !
U.S.S.R.! 44% ! 19% I1 16% ! 8% ! 13% !Total $12 bil.
♦ E.EUROPE! ^48% ! 11% 11 11% ! 10% 1 20% 1 Total $13 bil.
Sources: OECD, The Economist, 29 April 1989
♦ Excluding U.S.S.R. '"Inc. trade with GDR
As indicated in Table 1, in 1988 Germany did more business 
with Eastern Europe and the former USSR than any other Western 
country. Also, during the first six months of 1989, before the 
wave of revolutions in Eastern Europe and the collapse of Eastern 
Germany, West German exports to and imports from these countries 
totaled $14.6 billion, roughly three times as much as the second- 
and third-places among Western countries, Italy ($5 billion) and 
the United States ($4.4 billion) (5).
After the unification, despite the unity strains, Germany 
has the goods, know-how, money, all the things the newly emerging 
Eastern democracies crave for. The question in the April 1989 
issue of the Economist is illustrative: "Will this surge of 
activity raise fears of German economic domination in Eastern 
Europe?"
The Economist also states that: "Germany’s aid to Eastern 
Europe between 1989 and 1992, more than DM 100 billion ($60 
billion), far exceeds that of other western states; its firms are 
the biggest investors there; it is expanding its scientific and
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cultural ties; and its efforts still run far behind demand."(6)
On the other hand, Cole Thompson points out, West German 
success in the Eastern bloc since the end of the Cold War rested 
on firm practices: a) an understanding of state-planned 
economies reactions to outside firms; b) stubborn pursuit of 
personal contacts; c) heavy and continuous support for Qsthandel 
by federal and state governments in West Germany; d) and the 
geographical closeness of the region (7). According to leuan 
John, one of the two basic factors from which the German problem 
stems is also Germany’s geographic location in the center of 
Europe, with the associated diplomatic and strategic 
implications (8).
There is also the cultural aspect of the new Ostool itik. 
Until 1979, West Germany’s Goethe Institute had its only Eastern 
European foothold in Yugoslavia. Then came another branch in 
Romania. From then on, in 1988, an institute was opened in 
Budapest and others followed in other East European countries, 
like Poland and Czechoslovakia (9).
Other West German Institutions were also pushed east. The 
Friedrich Naumann foundation, close to Gencher’s FDP, has had 
an office in Budapest since 1989. In the same year, the Friedrich 
Ebert foundation, close to SPD, established one in Moscow.
Wolfgang Seiffert argued that German unification has four 
main concrete effects on Eastern Europe; "the cold war ended; 
interior contradictions within these countries are breaking and
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the market economy becomes apparent; all these countries ai'e 
awaiting political and economic support from Germany, and, 
firiiilly the German unification gave a new impulse to the 
independence-processes of the East European countries." (10)
Briefly, as Eckardt Arnold pointed out in 1991, Germany’s 
old commitments (multilateralism, close Atlantic ties, and the 
idea of European integration) will be complemented by new 
responsibilities such as: a new relationsln'p of cooperation with 
the Soviet Union, and a special concern for the young East 
European democracies (11).
The rest of this chapter will describe united Germany’s 
relationship with the Eastern European countries, mainly with 
Russia, Poland, and Czechoslovakia (12). These cases were 
selected because they illustrate the major examples of the 
changes in German Ostpolitik.
4.1. Germany and the Soviet Union
During the twentieth century, Germany and the Soviet Union, 
the two major continental powers of Europe, fought each other in 
two world wars. They also concluded many surprising, often sudden 
agreements, such as the Rapollo Pact for economic cooperation in 
1922, the Hitler-Stalin alliance in 1939 -the Molotov-Ribbentrap 
Pact, the 1990 agreements on unification within NATO, and lastly 
the German-Soviet treaty (13). According to Menges "German- 
Soviet relations are of vital interest to both countries, are 
subject to surprising shifts, and have a major impact on world
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affairs" (14).
In November 1990, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and 
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl signed a "Treaty on Good- 
Neighborliness, Partnership, and Cooperation." (15) With that 
treaty, Syinser argues, they renewed the connection between 
Germany and Russia as they had in 1890. But Bismarck was 
dismissed in 1890 by Kaiser Wilhelm, for his seci'et Reinsurance 
treaty with the Russian Emperor. With this treaty Germany and 
Russia had pledged that they would not make war upon each other 
and would remain neutral unless Germany attacked France or Russia 
attacked Austria-Hungary.
The treaty of 1990 also provides for neutrality in some 
situations. It states that if one of the two states should 
became the target of aggression, then the other side will give 
the aggressor no military aid or other support. This provision 
would mean, according to Symser, that Germany would not take part 
in NATO attacks on the Soviet Union. The German Government, 
however, declared that the treaty is fully compatible with its 
NATO commitments, because NATO is a defensive alliance that 
would never attack the Soviet Union (16).
In fact, a three-fold bargain emerged during the German- 
Soviet and Two plus Four negotiations of 1990, and it is this 
bargain that forms the basis of the new German-Soviet 
relationship. This arrangement has military, economic, and 
political dimensions (17).
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Moscow offered the main concessions in the first 
dimension in this bai’gain. The Soviet forces in Eastern Germany, 
which for decades threatened West Germany are to be withdrawn. 
The treaty for the limitation of Conventional Forces in Europe 
(CFE) also mandates the reduction of Soviet military power 
throughout the continent.
The German government also made some important concessions. 
Bonn agreed to limit its armed forces to a total of 370.000 
soldiers. Even with this ceiling, Germany would have the maximum 
number of troops in Western Europe, but not enough to threaten 
former Soviet territories. Germany has also agreed to continue 
to accept the post-World War II Allied guidelines that limits the 
types of weapons it can develop or deploy (18).
About united Germany’s NATO membership, the German secretary 
general of NATO, Manfred Woerner, was key in persuading Moscow 
that a united Germany in NATO would not constitute a threat. 
Significantly, Woerner was in Moscow during the Gorbachev-Kohl 
summit, October 1990, at which Gorbachev accepted Germany’s NATO 
membership.
The second dimension of the relationship was economic. 
Germany’s economic support to the Soviet Union had in fact 
begun in 1988. During Kohl’s visit to Moscow, in October 
1988, six official agreements were signed, including co-operation 
in space technology, and environmental protection, etc. More than 
30 deals were made between West German companies and Soviet 
partners. One of the biggest of these was a DM 3 billion ($1.7
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billion) credit offered by a German bank consortium led by the 
Deutsche Bank (19).
In the treaty of November 1990, Germany made the majority of 
concessions. Table 2 shows that two German-Soviet economic 
treaties boosted economic cooperation. One agreement provided 
for German support to the Soviet Union in economics, industry, 
science, and technology. Another provided for cooperation between 
labor and social service agencies in the two countries (20).
Table 2: Germany’s (*) Trade with the former Soviet Union
¡1985 !1986 ¡1987 ¡ 1988 ¡ 1989 ¡1990 ¡1991 ¡1992 (")¡
EXP.1 3.8 1 4.5 ¡ 4.6 ¡ 5.0 ¡ 6.0 ¡ 6.2 ¡ 10.5 ¡ 8.8 ¡ $ bil.
IMP.¡4.5 ¡ 4.3 ¡ 4.0 ¡ 4.0 ¡ 4.4 ¡ 5.8 ¡ 8.5 ¡ 7.8 ¡ $ bil.
Source: OECD, (*) 1985- 
P) First
1990 West German only, 
seven months
After the unification, Soviet leaders wanted Germany to 
provide large quantities of aid and trade. The German government 
has pledged to lend even more. Through a number of agreements, 
Germany agreed to offer the Soviet Union a total of about DM 70 
billion ($40 billion) in the years 1991 and 1992. This sum was 
equivalent to almost 3 percent of Germany’s GNP in 1990. "Germany 
is helping the Soviet Union more than any other country," stated 
Kohl (21). In spite of a slowing economy and the burdens of 
unification, Germany has already rapidly become the chief 
trader and the leading investor nearly everywhere in Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union.
Beyond immediate trends, analysts say there is a special
54
long-term and broad-based dimension to the German interest in the 
East. This long-term interest is encouraged by the German 
government, which is aware that Germany is more threatened than 
any other power if economic collapse leads to political unrest in 
Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union. Germany fears a 
large migration wave especially from Russia (22).
In fact, part of the impetus for German investment is 
historical (23). Many German companies are reviving ties going 
back to the pre-communist era and even to the time of the 
Ilabsburg ruled Austria-Hungarian Empire before the end of World 
War I.
Economics Minister Juergen Moellemann, in February 1992, 
brought 30 top German executives with him on a trip to encourage 
investment in the former Soviet Union, where many large German 
firms have traditional ties. For example, Siemens AG, a giant 
German technology company, was active in the Ukraine before 
World War I.
As a result, Germany is by far the largest donor of official 
aid to the East. In 1992, nearly DM 27 billion covered business 
in the Soviet Union alone and there were applications for another 
DM 25 billion (24).
Germany has also helped the Soviet Union in international 
economic matters. The German government promised to advocate the 
rescheduling of Soviet debts to Western International agencies. 
Even Kohl himself worked hard to overcome U.S. and British
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reluctance to invite Gorbachev to the July 1991 London 
summit of the seven leading industrialized countries (G-7) (25).
Overall, German trade and aid do not just help the Soviet 
Union, Germany benefits as well by supporting its industry and 
providing jobs. This reinforces Germany’s international 
financial position. According to Symser, through the European 
Monetary System (EMS), Western Europe is already a D-mark zone, 
tlie addition of Eastern Europe to this area would greatly enlarge 
the breadth of German economic influence (26).
The third dimension of German-Soviet relations is political. 
Briefly, the German government has consistently done everything 
possible to help Gorbachev and is doing the same to his 
successor, Boris Yeltsin. Because of Gorbachev’s opposition to 
unification in 1990, Bonn has repeatedly made clear that 
Germany and NATO want accommodation and peace with Moscow.
Almost every statement by the officials in Bonn has 
contained assurances that Germany wants a new Europe and a new 
relationship with the former Soviet Union. The themes of peace, 
stability, and a new European security have repeatedly been 
emphasized in their speeches (27).
In bilateral relations, Germany and the Soviet Union have 
pursued policies and granted concessions with complementary 
benefits to each other. The USSR has primarily received economic 
gains and some security benefits as well. Germany’s gains 
are mainly in the realm of security, but it is benefiting
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economically as well. Symser argues, that Germany, by signing 
Uie Lreaty, undertook an implicit obligation to respect Soviet 
feelings (28).
Finally, a united Germany remains in NATO as a member of 
Western society and the central message is that Germany will not 
use its new position to threaten Soviet interests.
5.2. Germany and Poland
The litmus test for the direction of Germany’s foreign 
policy was and no doubt remains in its relationship to Poland and 
Czechoslovakia, said Harald Mueller (29). Tliese Eastern 
neighbours suffered most from German aggression in this 
century. That is why, Muller argues that this relationship is far 
more significant than Gei'raany’s ties to the successors of the 
Soviet Union (30).
Germany’s leading role in providing aid to the former Soviet 
Union, support for its admission to the international economic 
and political organizations can be interpreted as an attempt to 
reach an agreement with the Russian colossus on dividing up 
Central and Eastern Europe. Germany’s rapprochement with Poland 
and Czechoslovakia, in contrast, should be seen, according to 
Mueller, as the expression of a willingness to be a good European 
c i tizen.
Another analyst, Uartmut Koschyk, on the other hand, argues 
that Germany’s good relationship with these countries, 
Poland and Czechoslovakia, is vitally important for the whole
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East European region.
Chancellor Helmut Kohl, confirming these statements, urged 
upon the unification that Western Europe embrace the fledgling 
democracies of eastern Europe. This can be viewed as a change 
in German foreign policy which brings up the question:" has Bonn 
tux’ned its foreign policy eastwards?" (31)
With respect to German-Polish relations there are mainly 
three major issues: borders, minorities, and an accounting for 
the past (32). The border issue made Poles the most nervous. The 
Warsaw treaty of 1970 had confirmed the Oder-Neisse line as the 
official border between the two countries (33). The final 
legal settlement of the issue was to be resolved when 
Germany was once again united.
Thus, when the German unification process began to pick up 
speed the border issue came immediately into the minds of the 
Polish government. Before the unification, the Polish Prime 
Minister Tadeusz Mazowieki tried desperately to extract a binding 
commitment from Kohl that Germany’s borders would not be 
questioned. Kohl’s replies were always the same: only a united, 
sovereign Germany could finally settle the issue (34).
Kohl’s hesitation stemmed purely from domestic concern, 
Mueller argues. He did not intend to change the border only to 
keep the vote of the Silesian immigrants for his Bavarian 
partners in the CSU. Kohl also wanted the Poles to give up their 
claims for reparations and to guarantee the rights of the
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German minority in Poland in return for border recognition (35).
With increasing pressure from all the members of the Western 
alliance, Genscher in September 1989, and the Interior Minister 
in February 1990, made statements which promised there would be 
no change in the German-Polish border (36).
After the Kohl speech in June 1990, that tlie border treaty 
was necessary to achieve unification, the Parliaments of both 
Germanys, FRG and the GDR, confirmed that a united Germany would 
accept tlie current border as permanent. A German-Polish border 
treaty was signed on November 16, 1990, which confirms the
existing borders. The border was also confirmed in the 
"two plus four" treaty, too (37).
The second issue in German-Polish relations was the minority 
rights for Germans living in Poland. Poland was extremely
reluctant to acknowledge minority rights. The communist regime 
had refused to recognize ethnic Germans as a minority. Once 
borders became more permeable this caused an upsurge of 
immigration to West Germany.
The third issue was "mutual accounting," or compensation, 
for Poles forced to work for the Germans in World War II and 
for nationalized property of Germans in Poland. This last problem 
was connected to the question of whether Silesians who had 
immigrated to Germany would be able to purchase land they had 
owned in Poland (38).
The friendship treaty, signed in June 17, 1991, guaranteed
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rights to the German minority in Poland in accord with the CSCE 
standards and laid down the foundations for co-operation in 
various fields (39). Poles who had been forced to work for the 
Germans during World War II were promised a limited compensation 
through a foundation set up by the German Government. Other 
issues were postponed for future settlement (40). Polish-German 
relations i-emained strained even after the conclusion of the 
treaties, especially on the border issue.
It is also obvious that Poland has been influenced by 
German culture. German influence in the region has become 
pervasive, especially in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, 
i.e., in personal contacts, business investment and intellectual 
life (41).
In Poland, according to the Goethe Institute, German now 
accounts for 30 percent of all foreign language instruction, 
the largest proportion of any foreign language. 18 million people 
are estimated to be studying German around the world and 
12 million are in the former East Bloc (42).
Germany is also the leading foreign investor in Poland. The 
end of Communism has meant that the German operation must 
pay its Polish workers higher salaries, but with new 
efficiencies. It is said that the political revolution 
offered higher profits for the German companies (43).
Polish government figures said German companies invested 
$153 million from 1989 to 1991 with American companies rating
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second at $62.5 million. No 1991 figures for investment in Poland 
were available. It can easily be seen from table three that 
Germany was also the leading investor, according to the 1992 
statistics, in Poland and Czechoslovakia followed by the USA and 
other Western states (44).
Table 3: INVESTING IN EASTERN EUROPE 1992
Total Foreign Investment In Each Of Three Counti'ies
11 GERMANY 1 UvSA ! OTHERS 11
POLAND ! 60% ! 25% ! 15% 1 Total $550 mil.
HUNGARY ! 20% ! 60% ! 20% 1 Total $1.1 bil.
CZECHOS.I 50% ! 25% 1 25% ! Total $850 mil.
Sources:Deutsche Bank, Business International
4.3. Germany and Czechoslovakia
Here, the border was not in question, but the minority and 
property rights were important issues to be solved. The CSU made 
itself the voice of the many Germans from the Sudeten region of 
Bohemia who had settled in Bavaria after World War II (45). 
The Sudeten Germans and the CSU requested an immediate halt to 
the selling of state-owned property in Czechoslovakia; 
resettlement rights for the emigrants in the Sudeten area; and 
compensation for expropriations of German property after World 
War II. The Czechoslovak government was anxious to settle these 
issues (46).
At first. Kohl hesitated to sign the treaty. For some months
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he took no action on the treaty finalized by Genscher and his 
Czechoslovak counterpart Jiri Dienstbier in October 1991 (47). 
Kohl agreed to sign the treaty in January 1992, under pressure 
from Prague, Genscher and his party, and the opposition. The 
treaty was finally endorsed by the Bundesx’at in June 1992 
despite the opposition of the CSU (48).
Kohl wanted the pact to be amended to cover compensation for 
the expelled Sudetens (49). In the end the treaty i^ as not 
changed. But the delay upset his counterparts in Prague, as his 
delay in 1990 over recognizing the Oder-Neisse line angered the 
Poles (50).
As in the economy, Czechoslovakia can not escape German 
influence in culture. In Czechoslovakia, when schoolchildren, in 
the summer of 1992, chose their own language courses for the 
first time, half of the students picked German. About 30 percent 
chose English and only 10 percent stayed with Russian.
Many German executives say their moves into Eastern Europe 
stem in part from basic economic factors. For instance, 
Volkswagen, Europe’s largest car manufacturer made more 
than half of its capital investment in countries outside 
Germany in 1992, where wages are lower -mostly into plants in 
Czechoslovakia, Spain, and Portugal.
Thus, in 1992 Volkswagen bought a controlling share in 
Skoda, the leading Czechoslovak car maker and Daimler-Benz, 
also, announced its intention to take over Alvia and
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Liaz, Czechoslovakia’s two truck makers (51). In Czechoslovakia 
companies can manufacture goods at one-sixth of Germany’s labor
cost (52).
It is interesting what Petr Pithart, the Prime Minister of 
the Czech region of Czechoslovakia, said "before we approve of 
additional German capital to our country, we shall perform a 
number of studies. We have to ask, for example, what is German 
capital? Does it have the same geopolitical context as in the 
1930s? (53). These thoughts show that fear of Germany is still 
alive, even at the top government level.
The former Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Jiri Dienstbier, 
however, looked to Germanization of his country from a different 
point of view. He said that "If the Americans and French are 
worried that Germany is trying to extend its sphere of influence 
to the east, that is their fault." He urged non-Germans to take 
the same risk as German investors have taken, rather than wait 
for economic reforms to be completed (54).
German investors, for their part, are trying to lower their 
profiles. They routinely keep old Czechoslovak company names, 
even for majority-owned German businesses. They train 
Czechoslovak managers and give them high-profile positions.
Nevertheless, it is accepted that German investment in 
Eastern Europe is not the result of a concerted, Japanese-style, 
government drive to conquer a new market. The German presence in 
Eastern Europe has been greatly boosted by major companies,
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banks, and trade groups, such as Wolff von Amerongen’s Eastern 
Committee (55).
For more than 30 years, this group had helped German 
companies establish ties to the former East Bloc. They made West 
Germany the most important trading partner for Eastern European 
nations even when the Bonn governments’ relations were cool 
with the Communist regimes.
Tlie Eastern Committee enables German firms to build on 
connections formed by West German companies that bartered with or 
bought from Communist Eastern European countries. And Germany has 
an extra advantage offered by former East German managers who 
until the unification were the East Bloc’s prime suppliers of 
machinery and technology.
Wolff von Amerongen said: "We have practically the same
industrial tradition as Czechoslovakia. We know the engineers in 
these countries, good scientists who stayed there all these 
years. So, when Volkswagen or Mei'cedes goes into the East, they 
can ask their sub-suppliers to come in top." (56)
Companies that have never dared to manufacture outside 
Germany have also began to think of doing so. BMW in 1992, 
started to work with an American assembly plant in 1992. 
Friedrich Grohe, a tap maker, bought a plant in Eastern Germany 
but then he changed his mind to manufacture elsewhere in Eastern 
Europe (57).
Germany is economically as well as culturally dominant in
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this 1‘egiou. The Goethe Institute, for instance, is opening new 
branches throughout Eastern Europe. Deutsche Welle, the 
government’s foreign broadcasting service, announced "a media and 
cultural offensive in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe." in 
1992. Director Dieter Weirich called Gernuiny the "most important 
media and cultural bridgehead between East and West." (58).
German executives say that the connection between language 
study and economic influence is direct and immediate. Already 
there are departments in German language within East European 
Universities to move young graduates quickly into training 
programs, and to provide local managei's in these countries for 
joint ventures.
In sum, what can be deduced from these cases is that, 
Germany, after achieving unification, changed the Cold War nature 
of its Qstnolitik and revised it according to the new 
International Systemic changes. Once again, Germany is going to 
be the predominant power in Central and Eastern Europe, as it was 
before the Second World War- now with positive and rational use 
of its historic, political, economic, and geographic advantages.
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CONCLUSION
This study showed that Bonn’s Ostpolitik before the
unification along with the Deutschlandpolitik which was 
subordinate to Ostpolitik ultimately aimed at German unification. 
By using different political tools in accordance with the 
international climate and domestic support, Bonn achieved its 
objectives.
Until 1969 there was no serious Ostpolitik implemented by 
the Bonn governments for several reasons: Westpolitik oriented
CDU governments enjoying domestic support; the Cold War
atmosphere; FRG’s post-war international status, being subjected 
to a unique degree of dependence and external constraints.
Brandt’s Ostpolitik did not replace but complemented,
Adenauer’s and his successors’ Westpolitik. Additionally,
Schmidt’s policies were so timely that he utilized the success of 
Brandt’s Ostpolitik to extend Germany’s influence world-wide. 
Schmidt could convert Germany’s economic capability into 
political influence in international political economy.
Thereupon Kohl from the early 1980s on could well use the 
attractiveness of West German trade and credit to encourage the 
East German and Soviet regimes to allow greater contacts between 
the two Germanies. As his predecessors, he viewed economics as 
the continuation of politics by other means.
The Unification of October 3, 1990 could be achieved with 
these timely and well applied policies paralleling the
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changing international post-war structures. Even in the late 
1980s FRG, with the essence of its Ostpolitik. began to 
increase its influence over Eastern Europe, just after USSR’s 
power had begun to decline in the region.
In fact, Ostpoli tik in the 1970s normalized relations with 
the East and then stopped. Deutschlandpolitik in the 1980s 
extended the relations, and with the help of the changing 
international climate unification occurred.
It would nevertheless be a mistake to believe that 
unification means the end of Deutschlandpolitik. Germany has been 
unified politically, but the material and mental division between 
its Western and Eastern parts still needs to be overcome. In this 
sense, Deutschlandpolitik will continue. It will be a part of a 
domestic policy which has to ensure that, after the political 
division, the social division, too is healed (1).
The world of the 1980s and 1990s is more complex than that 
of the 1960s and 1970s. The world has changed, Europe has 
changed, and the Germans have changed. Whatever the Germans’ 
special path through the new European order may turn out to be, 
it will be a road different from that of the past. So will 
the Ostpolitik.
When the European revolutions of 1989-1990 ended the Cold 
War and the division of Europe, an older Europe re-emerged. The 
new united Germany returned to its historic, political, 
economic and geographic centrality in Europe (2).
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The prospect is not, however, a Germany bent on 'military 
aggression’ but a Germany bent on 'economic expansion.’ This 
prospect can not be avoided, or contained, by Germany’s continued 
membership in the international organizations, such as the EU, 
and NATO.
The new Germany, as Hans-Peter Schwarz and some other German 
political scientists argue and even support, will probably be 
more traditionally German and even more prepared to pursue its 
legitimate national interests, like any other normal states. 
The new circumstances provide Germany with even greater 
opportunities than in the past to pursue economic-political 
influence and become the predominant power not only in the 
European Union but in Central and Eastern Europe, as it was 
before the Second World War.
There is, howevei·, a debate going on over what Germany’s 
national goal and interest in Europe and in the international 
arena should be (3). In fact, after the Soviet Union has gone 
and united Germany is back there is obviously a new self 
confidence in German foreign policy.
German officials argue that the other West European 
countries were indifferent to their calls for help in Eastern 
Europe. That is why they forced to proceed alone. They 
continue to say that they are blamed for wanting to go their own 
way so as to fulfill their nationalistic feelings.
On the other hand, however, it also said that if they really
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wanted policy cooperation, German leaders would have to realize 
that they can not decide to opt out whenever they decide that an 
issue has became too scary for them to wait for a 
consensus (4).
These two arguments in fact show the new feelings of self- 
confidence in Bonn’s foreign policy making. In many European
Iminds the question has arisen: ’Is Germany pursuing, with the 
help of its new Ostpol1tik. its earlier goal of continental 
hegemony?"
Obviously not, because Germany is Europe’s economic 
powerhouse, but not its superpower. As Manfred G. Schmidt argues, 
as long as Germany’s foreign policy leadership broadly accords 
with rational cost-benefit calculus and a widely defined national 
interest, the emphasis will be on continuity in foreign political 
and economic policy, and thus on a 'trading state’ policy. He 
continues to say that:
The Federal Republic has long pursued <x 'trading 
state’ policy rather than a 'big power policy’.
A 'trading state policy’ places priority on peaceful 
exchange of goods and services, on trade rather than 
on military gambles, on economic expansion in a 
world market rather than on military expansion, and 
on an open economy rather than on autarchy. 
Precisely that kind of trading state policy has been 
a major pillar of West Germany’s economic success 
story from 1949. From a cost-benefit calculus and a 
national interest approach there is no viable and no 
acceptable alternative to a 'trading state’ foreign 
policy for Germany.(5)
According to him that policy has been a core of the
consensus between the major parties in West Germany and in
unified Germany. Because Germany lives by exports: every third
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job depends on them; they provide one-third of Germany’s GDP. 
Additionally G. Schmidt says that there are few incentives for 
the Gei'man political class or for a majority of it to defect from 
the 'trading state’ approach.(6)
Right from the start, Germany very strongly supported the 
process of reforms in Central and Eastern Europe, politically, 
economically, and financially through training and in many other 
ways. With their economic weight, 80 million Germans are already 
gaining unmatched influence over the vulnerable states in Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union. This should be the basis for 
a more assertive new Ostpolitik.
Hence, there are two important reasons why Germany 
should have a new constructive Ostpolitik. On the one hand, 
Germany has a keen interest in the success of the Eastern 
European process of reforms, economically as well as 
politically. Located in the center of Europe, Germany would 
inevitably be affected by the failure of reform in these 
neighboi'ing post-communist states that could entail mass 
migration and even more severe ecological degradation.
On the other hand, Wolfgang Krieger argues that Germany 
is investing heavily in Eastern Europe, but without any political 
vision that reaches beyond the obvious - that peace and stability 
in this part of Europe are vital concerns (7). In a sense, he is 
right. But the main reason for this new Ostpolitik. also 
according to the Schmidt explanations lies in the long-term 
interest of the German economy.
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One important fact is that Germany’s direct investment in 
Eastern Europe is more than other Western States’. In the long­
term, as Germany is pushing forward, the Eastern European 
countries would probably join the European Union. So they will 
then begin to sell their products more easily throughout the 
continent.
In the long-term, the economic maturation of the region will 
create millions of consumers and so Germany will regain its 
historic place as a fundamental part of Eastern Europe’s economy. 
Consequently, unified Germany will become even more dominant 
economically and politically on the whole European continent.
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